Kindra O\\u27Bryant v. Lisa Pier by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2020 
Kindra O\'Bryant v. Lisa Pier 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Kindra O\'Bryant v. Lisa Pier" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 602. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/602 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3049 
__________ 
 
KENDRA O’BRYANT; BRIAN FLANDERS; ARTIE PEOPLES, 
           Appellants 
 
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND  
PERMANENCY, (#DCP&P) formerly known as DIVISION OF YOUTH &  
FAMILY SERVICES; LISA VON PIER; ALLISON BLAKE;  
LISA CAPONE; CONCHITA VARGA; BRYANT ROLLS; SHERIFF  
GILBERT WILSON, “WHIP”; SHERIFF DEPUTY T. NICHOLS;  
ALICIA ASH; SHERIFF DEPUTY GURKIN; JONATHON GARRETT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-07752) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 16, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiffs Kindra O’Bryant, Brian Flanders and Artie Peoples appeal from the 
District Court’s order dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction and, 
alternatively, abstaining under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  We will affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
  For present purposes, we accept plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and liberally 
construe them in plaintiffs’ favor.  O’Bryant is the mother of three minor children, the 
youngest of whom (K.F.) was born in August 2017.  Flanders, who is K.F.’s father, lives 
or lived with O’Bryant and her two other children.  Peoples is O’Bryant’s father and 
periodically cared for the children as well.  
Plaintiffs filed this suit1 pro se under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 naming two 
groups of defendants to which we refer as the Child Protection Defendants and the 
Sheriff Defendants.2  It is unnecessary for present purposes to recount all of plaintiffs’ 
allegations.  In brief, however, plaintiffs alleged that defendants wrongfully seized 
O’Bryant’s two other children while she was in the hospital giving birth to K.F. and then 
immediately seized K.F. as well.  Plaintiffs acknowledged that defendants did so at or 
 
1 The copies of plaintiffs’ complaint filed below and submitted on appeal are missing 
page five.  Neither the District Court nor the parties have addressed that issue. 
 
2 The Child Protection Defendants are the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and 
Permanency and certain of its officials and employees.  The Sheriff Defendants are the 
Camden County Sheriff, two deputy sheriffs, and various John Doe defendants.  Because 
our disposition does not require us to identify the alleged conduct of specific defendants, 
we refer at times to allegations against “defendants” or groups thereof without suggesting 
that any specific defendant engaged in or is responsible for the specific conduct alleged. 
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near the time of filing a child abuse/neglect complaint against O’Bryant and Flanders in 
New Jersey state court (which, as far as the record reveals, remains pending).  Plaintiffs, 
however, did not directly assert any claims regarding that proceeding.   
Instead, they alleged that defendants’ seizure of the children violated plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights because the children were not in imminent danger of abuse or 
neglect and defendants had no lawful justification for believing otherwise.  Plaintiffs also 
alleged that the seizure followed an abusive investigation during which defendants 
coerced O’Bryant into signing an unnecessary and unworkable family plan agreement 
under threat of removing her children but then removed her children anyway after 
breaching defendants’ own promise to help remedy various living conditions about which 
they expressed concern. 
On the basis of these and other allegations, plaintiffs sought damages and 
injunctive relief, including an order requiring defendants to implement policies regarding 
the removal of children from their parents.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The District Court granted those motions and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction.  The District Court also concluded that, if it had jurisdiction, it 
would abstain from exercising it under Younger.  Plaintiffs appeal.3 
 
3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Susinno v. Work Out 
World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017).  We also exercise plenary review over the 
legal requirements for abstention, but we review the District Court’s ultimate decision to 
abstain for abuse of discretion.  See Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 
F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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II. 
 The Due Process Clause places procedural and substantive limits on a State’s 
ability to interfere with parents’ rights “in the custody, care and management of their 
children.”  Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 
(3d Cir. 1997).  Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated those rights in this case.  None 
of the defendants argued below that the plaintiffs failed to state—or by amendment could 
not state—any plausible constitutional claim based on the removal of O’Bryant’s and 
Flanders’s children from their care.  Nor did the District Court address that issue.  
Instead, the District Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the 
“domestic relations” exception to federal jurisdiction and that, in the alternative, it would 
abstain from exercising such jurisdiction under Younger.  Plaintiffs challenge both of 
those rulings on appeal, and we agree that those rulings require remand. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
None of the defendants invoked the “domestic relations” exception below, and 
none squarely defends the District Court’s reliance on that exception on appeal.  That is 
for good reason.  The domestic relations exception is “an exception to federal diversity 
jurisdiction,” and it “encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, 
alimony, or child custody decree.”  Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC., 545 
F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted).  This 
exception does not apply to claims like the plaintiffs’ here that invoke federal question 
jurisdiction, see McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1989), and 
plaintiffs’ claims do not involve any divorce, alimony or child custody decree. 
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The Child Protection Defendants nevertheless argue that plaintiffs’ claims 
represent an unwarranted intrusion on their ability to investigate cases of child abuse and 
neglect.  Relatedly, all defendants argue (either expressly or by analogy) that plaintiffs’ 
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Characterizing plaintiffs’ claims as 
relating solely to the State’s investigation, however, construes them too narrowly.  
Plaintiffs are not merely challenging defendants’ investigation.  Instead, their allegations 
can be read to challenge specific instances of alleged misconduct, including the removal 
of O’Bryant’s and Flanders’s children from their custody. 
For similar reasons, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.  That narrow 
doctrine divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear what are in essence appeals from 
state-court judgments, and it applies only when (inter alia) the plaintiffs have lost in state 
court and seek to redress injuries allegedly caused by the state-court judgment.  See B.S. 
v. Somerset Cty., 704 F.3d 250, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2013).  The doctrine does not apply here 
because the injuries of which plaintiffs complain are traceable to defendants’ alleged 
conduct rather than to any state-court judgment (which in this case apparently has yet to 
issue).  See id. at 260.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s ruling that it lacked  
subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. 
B. Abstention 
The District Court alternatively concluded that it would abstain under Younger in 
favor of the New Jersey abuse/neglect proceeding.  The District Court did so after 
accepting defendants’ invitation to apply a three-part test derived from Middlesex County 
Ethics Committee v. Garden States Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).  As defendants now 
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acknowledge, however, “the three Middlesex conditions are no longer the test for 
Younger abstention” following Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 
(2013).  Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation 
marks omitted).  Instead, under Sprint, the three Middlesex factors come into play only 
after a District Court concludes that a civil action relates to an ongoing state-court 
proceeding that falls within one of three categories:  “(1) ongoing state criminal 
prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) pending civil 
proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 
perform their judicial functions.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).   
Consistent with defendants’ arguments below, the District Court did not determine 
whether the New Jersey child abuse/neglect proceeding fits within any of these 
categories.  The Sheriff Defendants now appear to argue that the proceeding fits within 
the second.  The Child Protection Defendants, by contrast, argue that it fits within the 
third.  We decline to resolve these issues in the first instance in part because the decision 
whether to abstain ultimately is committed to the District Court’s discretion.  Thus, we 
will vacate the District Court’s decision to abstain under Younger as well.  The District 
Court is free to revisit that issue under the proper legal framework. 
C. Remaining Issues 
Finally, the defendants argue that we should affirm on various alternate grounds 
specific to various categories of claims and defendants.  We decline to address most of 
those issues in the first instance under the circumstances presented here.  Among those 
circumstances are the facts that none of the defendants’ alternative arguments would 
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appear to resolve this case in its entirety and that many of them, even if meritorious, 
might warrant leave to amend the complaint.  As with abstention, the decision whether to 
permit amendment is within the discretion of the District Court (though District Courts 
generally must permit amendment, whether requested or not in civil rights cases like this, 
unless it would be inequitable or futile).  See Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Thus, we decline to address most of defendants’ alternative arguments, and 
the District Court is free to consider them on remand. 
There is one exception.  The Child Protection Defendants argue that the Division 
and its employees in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages because the Division is an arm of 
the State of New Jersey.  We agree.  See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 
297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “render[s] 
states—and, by extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the state is 
the real party in interest—generally immune from suit by private parties in federal 
court”).  Thus, we will affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages 
against these defendants on this alternate ground.  We express no opinion on whether the 
immunity of the Division’s employees extends to plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief.  
See id. 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part, vacate 
it in part, and remand for further proceedings.  In doing so, we express no opinion on the 
truth of plaintiffs’ allegations, on the merits of their remaining claims, or on whether 
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those claims are otherwise sufficient to proceed beyond the pleading stage.  Plaintiffs’ 
request in their brief for appointment of counsel is denied because we perceive no need 
for counsel for this appeal. 
